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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. SMITH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
Cross-Respondent, and
Respondent herein

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No. 890129

Defendant, Respondent,
Cross-Appellant, and
Petitioner herein,
and EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.
This brief is submitted by Richard S. Smith

(hereinafter

"Smith") in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed

by

Rocky

Mountain

Helicopters

(hereinafter

"Rocky

Mountain") on April 7, 1989.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The

questions

presented

for review

by Rocky

Mountain's

Petition are stated on page 1 of Rocky Mountain's brief.

1

REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
All relevant reports and opinions issued by the Court of
Appeals are attached to Rocky MountainTs brief,
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Smith asserts that this Court does not have jurisdiction by
reason of the untimely filing of the Petition (See argument under
Point I, infra).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Smith is unaware of any constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations that would be controlling

in

this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to determine the rights of the parties
with respect to 11,445 shares of stock issued by Rocky Mountain
Helicopters

pursuant

to

the

terms

of

a contract

that

was

wrongfully terminated by Rocky Mountain,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

January,

(hereinafter

1981,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Richeird

Smith

"Smith") entered into an employment contract with

Defendant-Respondent
"Rocky Mountain").

Rocky

Mountain

Helicopters

(hereinafter

The primary negotiator for Rocky Mountain was

its acting President, Jim Burr (hereinafter "Burr") (Tr. 17).
2

The

initial

contract

was

in

all

practical

aspects

an

employment contract whereby Smith was to act as Vice President of
Finance in exchange for a salary and incentive bonus.
One of the primary duties of Smith under the employment
contract was to locate a buyer and negotiate a sale of all of the
stock and/or assets of Rocky Mountain to a third party.

(R. 291)

However, as Smith attempted to perform his obligations, he was
repeatedly

hampered

Mountain officers.

by

the actions of Burr

and

other

Rocky

First, Rocky Mountain secretly issued 58,000

shares of Rocky Mountain stock to Burr and his brother thereby
diluting the interest of all other shareholders, including Smith.
By reason of Smith's objections, the new issue of stock to Burr
was

cancelled

distracting

(Tr.

and

obligations.

43-44).

hampered

However,
Smith's

Second, when Smith

the

efforts

transaction

was

to

perform

his

performed

his

successfully

primary duties and obtained a Letter of Intent from a buyer (the
buyer was called Offshore Logistics Company) committing to the
purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain (Tr. P-9),
Burr suddenly changed his mind and refused to pursue the stock
sale (Tr. 46-50).

Finally, despite Smith's attempts to perform

his

Burr

obligations,

attempted

to

unilaterally

amend

the

employment agreement by limiting Smith's authority and thereby
impairing his ability to perform. (Ex. P-ll)
Rocky

Mountain's

repeated

interference

with

Smith's

performance caused a significant dispute to arise between the
parties. (R. 294) However, the parties succeeded in compromising
3

their

differences

by

preparing

new

agreements

which

were

designated as a "consulting agreement" and an "escrow agreement"
(Tr.

109).

prior

The escrow agreement specifically stated that all

agreements were

superceded

and that the new

agreements

constituted the sole agreements between the parties (Exs. P-13 &
P-14).

It is the consultation agreement and escrow agreement

that are the subject matter of this litigation.
Before summarizing the terms of the consulting and escrow
agreements,

it

should

be

noted

that

pursuant

to

the

prior

employment agreements, Smith was issued 11,445 shares of Rocky
Mountain stock as partial consideration for services under the
prior agreements.

(Ex. P-7)

Under the new Consulting Agreement, Smith was to be employed
by Rocky Mountain for the period of one year.
assignment
Smith,

was to sell the company

in turn, agreed

Mountain

stock,

memorialized

in

or raise equity

to place his

11,445

(Cert. #103) in escrow.
a writing

dated

His principal

shares

funding.
of

Rocky

This agreement was

February

15,

1984, which

consisted of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Smith and Burr
and an Escrow Agreement prepared by Rocky Mountain's attorney,
Jerry Thorn.

The actual signing of the Escrow Agreement was

February 27, 1984 (Exs. P-13 & P-14).
Under the Consulting Agreement, Smith's principal assignment
involved

activities

towards the goal of either

selling

Mountain or adding additional equity to the company.

Rocky

He would

also act as an agent of Rocky Mountain in his efforts to raise
4

equity capital and function as a financial or corporate planning
advisor to Burr and Rocky Mountain in whatever areas they might
see fit.
The consulting agreement provided that for his consulting
services, Smith would

receive consideration

in the amount of

$275.00 per day or $137.50 per half day for the time that Smith
spent rendering consulting services for the Company.

Smith was

also to receive the benefit of having his medical and dental
insurance paid for by the Company and continued life insurance
and associated health insurance.
Under the consulting agreement, Smith received his income
taxes prepared for the 1983 tax year, $1,000.00 worth of spousal
travel upon approval, use of the Xerox machines and use of the
Watts lines for personal use only.

Smith was given an Oldsmobile

automobile and four new tires for the car in exchange for accrued
vacation, sick time and separation benefits. Smith was to receive
50 gallons of gasoline per month and an agreement was provided
for the exchange of Smith's receivables from the Windgate Oil for
a Suburban automobile. (Ex. P-13)
The Escrow Agreement, which is dated February
provided

that the was to be understood

17, 1984,

by Rocky Mountain and

Smith, that this Escrow Agreement superceded all prior agreements
and was the sole agreement between the parties governing
disposition of stock (Ex. P-14).

5

the

The Agreement also provided as follows:
"If, at any time during the oney e a r from the d a t e of this
agreement,
ROCKY
MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC., is sold to a
third party, or parties, either by
virtue of a majority of its assets
b e i n g p u r c h a s e d , o r , in the
alternative, any public or private
sale of its stock or the stock of
any subsidiary takes place, then in
that event, the shares of stock
represented by the certificates
deposited herewith will be returned
to Richard S. Smith; provided that
if any negotiation for the sale of
assets or stock have begun prior to
the expiration of one year from the
date hereof, that result in such a
sale, then and in that event, such
sale will be considered to have
occurred within the one year
previously mentioned herein.
Provided further that in the event
the conditions described herein do
not occur within one year from the
date of this agreement, then stock
represented by Certificate #
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTER, INC.
During the latter portion of 1983, there was a crash of one
of Rocky Mountain's insured helicopters.

Pursuant to ein existing

agreement between the shareholders, the insurance proceeds were
required

to be distributed

to

some

of

the

accordance with their proportionate shares.
was accomplished in early 1984 (Tr. 152).

shareholders

in

This disbursement
Later, the company

requested that the shareholders return their proportionate share
of the insurance proceeds.

Burr became upset with Smith when

Smith refused to return the money (Tr. 149).

6

As a result of this argument concerning the ownership of the
insurance proceeds from the helicopter crash,
sued Smith on April 16, 1984.

Rocky Mountain

Three days later, on or about

April 19, 1984, the suit was settled.

Based on this law suit,

and other factors, the relationship between Rocky Mountain and
Smith was strained. (R. 298)
On March 4, 1984, Smith officially resigned as a Director of
Rocky Mountain Helicopters.

In his formal letter, Smith stated:

"this no way affects my availability and willingness to continue
to serve under the Consulting Agreement in areas that are deemed
appropriate, and particularly with respect to efforts to sell the
Company or equity therein'1. (Ex. D-27)
On April 23, 1984, Smith's Consulting Agreement with Rocky
Mountain Helicopters was terminated by Burr as president of Rocky
Mountain. (Ex. P-20)

The trial court specifically

found that

this termination by Rocky Mountain was wrongful (R. 299-300)
This case was submitted to the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park.
The lower court held that there was a valid employment contract
between

plaintiff

and defendant.

(R. 299)

The

lower

court

further held that Rocky Mountain had breached the contract by
wrongfully terminating Smith, and, as such, Smith was entitled to
Judgment against the defendant Rocky Mountain as follows:
(a)

$600.00 for gasoline benefit

(b)

$2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses
the plaintiff incurred during the term of the
Consulting Agreement.
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Notwithstanding

this holding, the Court held

that Rocky

Mountain was entitled to the return from the escrow agent of the
11,445

shares

of

Company

stock

inasmuch

as

the

Consulting

Agreement and Escrow Agreement provided for the return of stock
in the event the Company was not sold or a public or private sale
of equity was not effected

(R. 299-300),

The Utah Court of

Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that
inasmuch

as

the

consulting

agreement

had

been

wrongfully

terminated, Smith was entitled to the 11,445 shares of stock.
(Opinion of the Court of Appeals as attached as Appendix "A" to
Rocky Mountainf s brief).
POINT I
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BY
REASON OF UNTIMELY FILING
Rocky Mountain's Petition should be denied by reason of the
fact that it was not timely filed.

In this regard, Rule 45,

Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides as follows:
"(a) A Petition for Writ of
Certiorari must be filed with the
Clerk of this Court within 30 days
after the entry of the decision by
the Court of Appeals.
. . . . (c) the
time for filing a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari runs from the
date the decision is entered by the
Court of Appeals, not from the date
of the issuance of the Remittitur.
If, h o w e v e r , a P e t i t i o n for
Rehearing is timely filed by any
party, the time for filing the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for
all parties (whether or not they
requested rehearing or joined in
the Petition for Rehearing) runs

8

from the date of the denial of
r e h e a r i n g or the entry of a
subsequent decision entered upon
the rehearing." (Emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals denied Rocky Mountain's Petition for
Rehearing by order dated March 6, 1989 (See Appendix "B" to Rocky
Mountain's Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

The Petition for

Writ of Certiorari was not filed until April 7, 1989, which is 32
days from the date of the rehearing denial.1
Rocky Mountain made no motion to extend the time for filing
the petition pursuant to Rule 45(e) of this Court's Rules and the
time permitted to file such a motion has expired.
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 45(e),

If the filing deadline with

respect to a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is viewed by the
Court in the same manner as the filing requirements for direct
appeals, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Rocky Mountain's
petition.

Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen

vs. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson vs. Stoker,
669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).
considered

as

a

Even if the untimely filing is not

jurisdictional

nevertheless violated

matter,

the mandatory

Rocky

Mountain

filing deadline stated

has
in

Rule 45.

x

The thirtieth day fell on a Wednesday. Thus, there is no extension by reason of a weekend
or holiday.
9

POINT II
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BY REASON OF
THE ABSENCE OF ISSUES WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF RULE 43
The absence of any issues justifying the issuance of a Writ
of Certiorari is apparent by a history of this case.

This appeal

was originally filed with this Court2 and thereafter referred to
the Court of Appeals.

The same factors which prompted the Court

to not hear the original appeal should be considered with respect
to hearing at this time.
It is clear that two (2) of the three (3) issues raised by
Rocky Mountain's Petition are outside the scope of the guidelines
stated

in

Rule

43, Rules

of

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

(See

"Questions Presented for Review" on page 1 of Rocky Mountain's
Petition).

The only issue that is remotely related

to these

guidelines is the claim that the lower court misinterpreted the
holding of a prior decision of this Court.
relate

to weighing

The other two issues

of the evidence presented

at trial and a

claimed invasion by the Court of Appeals into the province of the
trial

court.

Neither

of

these matters

are

appropriate

for

consideration by the Court pursuant to a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari under Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Rocky Mountain makes no effort whatsoever to argue why the
granting of the petition would serve the purposes stated in Rule

2

The case number assigned to the matter at the time of its initial filing with this Court
was Case No. 870265.

10

43.

It is readily apparent that Rocky Mountain merely seeks a

repeat of the appellant review that has already been performed by
the Court of Appeals.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED PRINCIPLES
STATED BY THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
Under Section "A" of Point I of its brief, Rocky Mountain
claims that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the holding
of this Court as stated in Fleming vs. Fleming-Felt Company, 7
Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712 (1958).

It is interesting to note that

"t^ie Fleming case was not cited in Rocky Mountain's brief to the
Court of Appeals or in oral argument before that Court.
Rocky Mountain argues that the lower court in the Fleming
case found that "the performance of a condition or promise was,
in fact, prevented by Plaintiff" (Rocky Mountain Memo. p. 11).
With

great

reliance on the word

"prevented",

Rocky

Mountain

argues that the appellant court's interpretation of Fleming was
unjustified because the trial court in this action failed to find
that

Smith's

performance

was not

"completely

frustrated"

or

"prevented".
It is readily apparent that Rocky Mountain, not the Court of
Appeals, misinterprets the Fleming decision.

The holding of the

Fleming case did not require that the employee's performance be
"completely
Fleming

frustrated" or

decision

required

"prevented".
only

that

On the contrary, the

the employee's

tendered

performance be refused by the employer who wrongfully terminated
11

the employment contract.

The relevant wording of the opinion is

as follows:
"However, the finding was made that
notwithstanding
the fact that,
'Plaintiff [Fleming] kept or offered to
k e e p and to p e r f o r m all of the
provisions of said agreement 1 th€>
Defendants 'refused to permit Plaintiff
to carryout his duties as general
manager' and terminated his status as
such, 'without any reason or cause,
provocation or excuse and [his duties]
were wrongfully transferred to Joseph H.
Felt 1 ".
The facts of the instant case likewise establish that Rocky
Mountain "refused to permit Smith to carryout his duties...and
terminated

his status" thereby making the Fleming decision an

appropriate precedent in this matter.

The finding of the lower

court in this matter, that the termination of the consultation
agreement did not "completely frustrate and prevent [Smith] from
finding

a buyer

decision.

for

the company..."

It is readily

apparent

is

that

superfluous
the Court

of

to

its

Appeal

likewise regarded this superfluous finding as irrelevant to the
issues (See Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 6, fn. 1 cittached to
Rocky Mountain's Petition as Appendix Ex. A ) .
If the finding that Smith was not prevented from performance
is considered as a finding of fact, it is wholly unsupported by
any evidence in the record.
"finding"

However, Smith asserts that the

is more appropriately

characterized

as an erroneous

legal conclusion.
Under Rocky Mountain's argument, an employee whose employer
wrongfully terminates his employment contract must nevertheless

12

appear

at work

despite

and

attempt

the revocation

to perform

his employment

by the employer

of

any

duties

authority

to

perform such functions.
POINT IV
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
LIKELIHOOD OF PERFORMANCE
Under Section "B" of Point I of its Petition, Rocky Mountain
claims

that

Smith

did

not

introduce

sufficient

evidence

to

establish that he would have performed if Rocky Mountain had not
wrongfully terminated the consulting agreement.
the problem of

In this regard,

"what would have happened but for the tort or

breach of contract" arises in many different settings.

It is

readily apparent that no Plaintiff has a "crystal ball".

By

reason of such a situation, the authorities hold that a party
whose performance was not permitted by wrongful termination, may
be treated or considered as though he had performed. 17A C.J.S.
§468;

See Gibbs vs. Whelan, 239 P.2d 727 (New Mex. 1952); Weaver

vs. Williams, 317 P.2d 1108 (Ore. 1957); Bewick vs. Mechan, 156
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1945); Pacific Venture Corporation vs. Huey, 104
P.2d 641 (Cal. 1940); Overton vs. Vita-Food Corporation, 210 P.2d
757 (Cal. 1949).
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Smith was required
to

establish

that

performance

would

have

occurred

if

the

consulting agreement had not been wrongfully terminated, Smith
satisfied
having

such requirement to the extent possible by one not

the ability

to foresee the future.
13

In this

regard,

pursuant
Mountain,

to

the

Smith

predecessor

employment

obtained

letter

a

of

contract
intent

with

from

a

Rocky
buyer

committing to the purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain
(Tr.,

p.

9;

Findings

of

Fact,

para.

13).

The

proposed

transaction was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors
of Rocky Mountain (Findings of Fact, para. 13).

However, Mr.

Burr, the president of Rocky Mountain, suddenly changed his mind
and

refused

demonstrated

to pursue

the sale

(Tr. 46-50).

This

evidence

Smith's ability to locate a buyer and obtain an

acceptable commitment to purchase.

Furthermore, Smith repeatedly

demonstrated competence and ingenuity in financial matters.

He

restructured Rocky Mountain's financial position by adopting new
accounting procedures; he refinanced corporate indebtedness with
a discount in favor of the company of approximately $750,000.00;
he favorably negotiated a dispute with preferred shareholders on
terms more favorably to the corporation than prior proposals and
secured releases from the preferred shareholders with respect to
claims asserted by them (Findings of Fact, para. 4 ) .
It is readily apparent, on the basis of these facts, there
was evidence in the record that performance would have likely
occurred.
genuine

It is further
belief

that

apparent that Rocky Mountain had a

Smith

would

perform

inasmuch

as

the

corporation agreed to compensate him for his services prior to
the time he succeeded in finding a buyer.

14

POINT V
TERMINATION OF THE CONSULTING AGREEMENT
ALSO TERMINATED AUTHORITY TO ACT
In Section

"C" of

Point

I, Rocky Mountain

attacks

the

statement by the Court of Appeals that the wrongful termination
of the consulting agreement stripped Smith of his authority to
bargain on behalf of the company.

In order to find some basis

for such an argument, Rocky Mountain characterizes the Court's
statement

as a unjustified

factual determination

and contends

that Smith was required to ignore the express termination of the
consulting

agreement

and

become

some

sort

of

"free

lance"

negotiator devoting his time and talents to the business of Rocky
Mountain in the hope that the company would graciously consent to
compensate

him

for

any

success

with

a

consideration

of

undetermined value.
An agency

relationship

§17; Restatement

is consensual. 3 Am.Jur.2d

(Second) of Agency, §15.

Agency

A person cannot

unilaterally obtain authority to act on behalf of a principal who
does not grant such authority, Restatement
§430.

(Second) of Agency,

It is clear from the wording and purpose of the consulting

agreement that the termination of the agreement

simultaneously

terminated any authority on the part of Smith to act for and on
behalf of Rocky Mountain.
Mr. BurrTs testimony at trial that he had a subjective and
undisclosed

intention

that the termination

of the consulting

agreement did not effect Smith's authority to act, is irrelevant.
15

A secret belief that one is authorized to act, especially when
the belief is inconsistent with the overt acts in terminating a
contract which provides

authority, does not create an agency

relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency, §15.

If Smith had

continued to act after the contract granting his authority to act
had been terminated, he would have subjected himself to personal
liability. Restatement (Second) of Agency, §430.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Smith submits

that Rocky

Mountain's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
DATED this

0\

day of April, 1989.

\

Robert M. McDonald
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
served

a true

and

accurate

copy

^>
of

day of April, 1989, I
the

foregoing

Brief

in

Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari upon the following
named persons by depositing said document in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert S. Young
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 1337
Provo, UT 84603
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